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The way we relate to information nowadays has defi-nitely changed the way we perceive knowledge. For 
instance, the internet came to revolutionise the circum-
stances in which we approach knowledge and form be-
liefs as more people than ever before have been drawn 
into the whirlwind of information. (Un)fortunately, not 
all of this information appears to be reliable. In a posi-
tive sense, this indicates that laymen are taking an active 
role in the exchange of ideas. On the other hand, serious 
flaws in the quality of information can result in confusion 
at best. 
 
The great variety of information and its quality, however, 
is not as unfortunate as we may think. One can certainly 
assume that with the explosion of information technology 
social moral frameworks have never before been put to 
the test as much by its adherents and outsiders. This chal-
lenge to what we believe and take for granted morally 
might be a necessary evil in order to gain more than we 
could lose in terms of social cohesion as we experiment 
with new technologies.  
This phenomenon, in my opinion, has not yet been thor-
oughly addressed by anthropologists, and its potential as 
an analytic tool has been overlooked. I think the main 
reason for this is the fact that it is full of subtleties con-
cealed by more visible social changes brought about by 
technology. Having said this, I believe social anthropo-
logical studies could benefit from acknowledging the 
value of this tangle of unreliable information. Although 
significance and value are very similar concepts, in this 
essay, they are not treated as the same thing; yet, as will 
become apparent, they are essential to each other. I under-
stand significance as socially meaningful and transform-
ing, and value as insightful and worth analysing. Hence, I 
would like to explore these two concepts in order to shed 
light on the effects of digital information on social moral 
frameworks and its usefulness as an analytic tool.   
First we need to differentiate between critical knowledge 
and what I would term ‘democratic knowledge’. The 
former originates when we are engaged, individually or 
socially, in serious and warranted thinking (e.g. profes-
sional or academic knowledge), while the latter refers to 
the type of knowledge engendered by the combination of 
reliable and unreliable information. ‘Democratic knowl-
edge’ is generated by the public itself. It tends to be very 
fluid in terms of personal beliefs and emotions, and is 
(re)created through the constant sharing of information. 
Virtually anyone who wishes to share information can 
contribute to ‘democratic knowledge’1, which can be ac-
cessed effortlessly through the internet.
One can find instances of this democratic knowledge in 
websites like ‘La Mia Cura – My Open Source Cure’. 
The latter is an open source website where everyone, ir-
respective of their cultural and educational background, 
can offer a cure to the creator of the website who was di-
agnosed with a cancerous brain tumour (Iaconesi 2012). 
The objective is for the website to become a source of 
knowledge comprised of everyone’s ideas to treat brain 
cancer, and which in turn can be consulted by anyone 
who is interested and/or has the disease. 
Another case which helps us visualise the potential of 
focusing on democratic knowledge is an ethnographic 
study of the internet in Trinidad and Tobago by Daniel 
Miller and Don Slater. In this ethnography, vertical – hi-
erarchical – organizational models followed by ‘Apos-
tolic’ religious institutions in Trinidad and Tobago have 
been consistently challenged by the ‘horizontal’ nature of 
opinion forums online (Miller and Slater 2000). In other 
words, the internet provides an arena where Christian be-
lievers voice their opinions even if they do not possess 
any relevant authority within the organized religion: ‘…
the interconnectedness and flow of information afforded 
by the internet gave new powers and autonomy to in-
dividuals, which had then to be understood within and 
disciplined by their institutions’ (Miller and Slater 2000: 
18). According to Miller and Slater, online forums have 
democratised the discussions and hermeneutics of Chris-
tians in Trinidad and Tobago which were once under the 
sole control of elders and religious leaders.
In my personal experience, during Mexico’s presidential 
election campaign in 2012 where thousands – if not mil-
lions – of posts flowed freely on Facebook in support of 
or against candidates, people were openly denouncing the 
vested interests of mainstream media. What I could gather 
from the many posts which inundated my Facebook page 
was the feeling of complete disbelief in any source of in-
formation not coming from the internet. The internet was 
held to be more reliable and objective. What struck me 
was the power of this ‘messy’ information synthesised as 
knowledge and shared around the web. On the contrary, 
for a student of Social Anthropology such as myself, this 
did not seem like a good indication of what was going on 
politically in Mexico since I was convinced that rumours 
were an unreliable measure of everyday activity. 
I was sceptical of analytical approaches which dwell on 
rumour-type phenomena as discussed by the anthropolo-
gist Veena Das (1998). This concern can also be raised for 
the Trinidad and Tobago case, since the average believer 
does not possess the specialised knowledge of a religious 
leader. The effect that the forums had over institutions 
could be only superficial since the flow of relevant and 
irrelevant information from all directions might have 
hampered any palpable change. This could also apply to 
‘La Mia Cura – My Open Source Cure’ and similar con-
temporary projects; we need to wait and see how these 
phenomena unravel.
Das thinks that, if used in research, the rumour-panic phe-
nomenon only offers a half-complete picture of what is 
1 I use ‘democratic knowledge’ in this sense throughout the 
paper, but without the quotation marks thereafter for ease of 
reading.
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relevant. As it is basically a proliferation of ideas which 
do not entail critical thinking from the individuals to 
whom the information is passed on, it behaves more like 
an inevitable contagion rather than a ‘well-absorbed’ 
medicine. In other words, it has a ‘contagion-effect’ (Das 
1998). She implies that information which has rumour-
panic characteristics lacks value, as it tends to be superfi-
cial: ‘There seems a transformation from social exchange 
to communal trance’ (Das 1998: 187).  Henceforth, one 
can conclude that the value of democratic knowledge as a 
research tool is hampered by this effect. 
However, Das is only concerned with the phenomenon of 
rumour-panic itself and not with the means used to spread 
that rumour. The very nature of the internet prevents this 
from happening, since there are more parties participating 
in the sharing of ideas. Moreover, the mix of information 
comprising democratic knowledge also comes from web-
sites which provide critical knowledge. There are news 
pieces and articles that can be read for free online from 
renowned magazines and newspapers like the Economist, 
freely accessible talks from experts on Ted.com, open ac-
cess journals like HAU2, and posts on critical thinkers’ 
personal blogs.  
Within anthropology itself, there is in fact a new phe-
nomenon introduced by cultural anthropologist Michael 
Wesch – ‘digital ethnography’ – which ‘explore[s] medi-
ated culture, seeking to merge the ideas of Media Ecol-
ogy3 and Cultural Anthropology’ (Wesch 2012a, 2012b). 
Besides the project analysing the democratisation of 
ideas through YouTube, it definitely is in itself education-
al, counting as critical knowledge. I embrace the view of 
Daniel Miller (2012) that ‘the digital might make anthro-
pology exciting, but more than that, significant’ (Miller 
2012: 390) – not just for the field of anthropology but 
more generally, providing a voice to everyone that can 
have access to free – unconstrained – internet. 
From all this I would say that democratic knowledge is 
actually insightful and hence valuable. It has somehow 
been indirectly analysed by anthropologists, but if we are 
to reap the benefits of this approach, it seems in real need 
of being addressed directly.   
Yet, does this type of knowledge possess any significance 
for society? Is it an oasis of change or simply a confusing 
and irrelevant mirage? Since misleading information cre-
ated and nurtured by the public is no better than deception 
contrived by the mass media and political leaders, one is 
right to question its significance beyond its mere value as 
an analytical tool and its significance as a contemporary 
global occurrence. Does it have a meaningful edge over 
mainstream disseminated knowledge, does it have any 
real power, or is it only a fad?  
In everyday life, one can assume that judging one’s ordi-
nary actions is merely a routine which does not involve 
critical thinking but only matching those actions to one’s 
moral framework: ‘Practice is merely socialized routine’ 
(Miller 2010: 419). However, when our ideas are con-
fronted on a grand scale with other people’s view of the 
world through digital media, I believe that ‘words…do, 
act, produce and achieve’ (Malinowski 1935: 52). Demo-
cratic knowledge engendered on the internet represents 
democracy and the possibility for faster social change, 
since it allows for greater human participation and ex-
change of information. One can think of social change as 
the transformation or mutation of the social moral struc-
ture. Zigon (2007) and Robins (2007) showed that moral 
values can be challenged, modified, and rejected in what 
Zigon called ‘moral breakdowns’.
In line with Michael Lambek’s (2008) theoretical frame-
work4, I argued in my dissertation (2012) that ethical val-
ues embody the freedom to exercise one’s will to choose 
the best moral values amongst those available. In other 
words, ethics is equivalent to freedom of expressing your 
choice of moral values. It must be noted that freedom and 
choice is essentially different for different cultures and 
societies at any given time. Therefore it is not only help-
ful but fair to acknowledge the fact that to a greater or 
lesser extent, in any society, there are options and thus 
decisions to make in the many areas of life, in this case, 
in the moral arena. 
I think this framework is helpful when assessing the 
significance of democratic knowledge, since the moral 
structure of a given culture/society is constantly put to the 
test by the overwhelming amount of relevant and irrel-
evant information found on the internet. One can think of 
a society experiencing changes in the way they see their 
culture and other cultures based on ideas coming from 
people living different realities (and in different places), 
sharing similar situations, or simply because knowledge 
previously held in specialised literature has become pub-
licly available. 
Therefore we can conceive, in a Bakhtinian sense, of 
social forces which challenge a cultural framework and 
move ‘outwards’ (centrifugally), as well as forces which 
attempt to bind the framework together (centripetally). 
Centrifugal forces are especially at play online since the 
internet represents the 21st-century’s democratic tool par 
excellence: ‘Centripetal forces reassert ideologies and 
moral frameworks and promote social cohesion whereas 
centrifugal forces challenge the establishment and strive 
for change and individuality’ (Acero Araluce 2012: 12). 
This is not to say that there are not centripetal forces on-
line, such as governmental, religious, and mass media 
2 HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory is an international 
peer-reviewed open access journal that focuses on the central 
role of ethnography for anthropological theorizing. 
3 Media Ecology is the theory which claims that technology 
not only influences our lives but also has a direct impact on our 
concept of things.
4 In my MSc dissertation (2012) I substituted his version of 
economic values for my version of moral values.
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broadcasters, as well as newspapers websites. But the 
internet possesses a broader scope that other sources of 
information lack; that is, it is democratic in terms of ‘or-
dinary’ people’s participation.
Thus even if we consider democratic knowledge to be 
deficient, it may be useful to conceive of it as providing 
more benefits than disadvantages. I believe its signifi-
cance resides particularly on the questioning and reshap-
ing power of moral frameworks that it informs. This in 
turn can have a direct or indirect impact on cultural, po-
litical, and religious frameworks: ‘[V]irtuality provides a 
kind of social laboratory or even liberation in which the 
performative character of all social realities and identities 
can be brought to light, deconstructed and transcended’ 
(Miller and Slater 2000: 5).
Two phenomena appear to be at play whenever we con-
tribute to or are influenced by democratic knowledge: 1) 
acting ethically, that is, freely but with personal responsi-
bility for choosing the best moral values available; and 2) 
questioning the validity of the pool of moral values when 
they do not seem to be beneficial for the public as a whole 
or for our personal lives. These, without a doubt, are the 
priceless corollary of starting the flow of democratic 
knowledge: ‘We can transform the role of knowledge, we 
can be human’ (Iaconesi 2012).
The accelerated sharing of information perpetuated by 
the internet has definitely had an impact on our social en-
vironment. The value of analysing data which has the po-
tential to provide us with more in-depth information be-
yond its numbing ‘contagion-effect’ – such as democratic 
knowledge – is certainly worth delving into. I believe that 
there is more to it than only a messy display of pseudo-
knowledge and general information which may say more 
about certain groups or individuals than about the popula-
tion as a whole, or perhaps more about the subtleties of 
a culture’s moral systems than about group or individual 
ideologies. It is necessary to keep an eye on the nuances 
of this information and be more creative in the way we 
approach them, as we might be overlooking what could 
conceivably be of great value to social anthropology and 
other social sciences. 
Exploring the effects of the digital on cultural moral 
frameworks in light of the value and significance of what 
I called ‘democratic knowledge’ is, I believe, one of the 
many possible ways one can address how cultures are 
dealing with new information technologies. More than 
that, I think the effect that this type of knowledge is hav-
ing on moral values is more beneficial than detrimental 
since people take more action over their ethics – select-
ing the most appropriate moral values available culturally 
– and do not relegate this obligation to others. In other 
words, the direct – and not mediated – participation of 
laymen online has become more active and as a conse-
quence has provided the opportunity for personal expres-
sion and choice (though this may be constrained by their 
societal norms), and the chance to debate and exchange 
their ideas with others such as in the instances mentioned 
above. This in turn has the possibility of engendering a 
more just society where everyone with online access and 
IT competency has the chance to think actively, engage in 
the exchange of ideas, voice their concerns, and also be 
accountable for their actions and thinking. 
While the effects of accessing knowledge online have al-
ready been felt across the globe, there is without doubt 
much more to come. It depends on us how we make use 
of future technologies, and must inevitably entail a care-
ful assessment of the knowledge made available through 
them. uf
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